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REGULATION A AND THE JOBS ACT: A FAILURE
TO RESUSCITATE
RUTHEFORD B CAMPBELL, JR.*
ABSTRACT
Regulation A offers small businesses an exemption
from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933. The exemption is generally consistent with the
obligation of the Securities and Exchange Commission to
fashion exemptions that balance investor protection and
capital formation. From the perspective of small
businesses, the exemption may appear to provide an
efficient access to external capital.
Regulation A, however, has fallen into nearly complete
disuse. The millions of small businesses in this country, all
of which at some point need external capital to survive and
grow, simply do not use Regulation A.
Two reasons account for small businesses' non-use of
Regulation A. First, the disclosure and filing requirements
for Regulation A are somewhat out of balance,
unnecessarily increasing the relative offering costs.
Second, and much more important, is the impact of the
registration provisions of state securities laws. The added
burden-and expense--of meeting the state registration
requirements simply price Regulation A out of the
marketplace for exemptions.
Congress recently passed the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act. Title IV of the JOBS Act delegates to the
Commission broad authority to enact new regulations that
cure the problems that made Regulation A unusable.
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the Commission will
step up to its responsibility to enact regulations that
provide small businesses with efficient access to external
capital. Historically, the Commission has shown an
unwillingness to expand by regulation the preemption of
state authority over the registration of securities. Without
* Rutheford B Campbell is the William L. Matthews, Jr. Professor of Law at the
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318 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7.2
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
preemption, the new regulatory regime under Title IV of
the JOBS Act will be useless to small businesses in search
of external capital.
Such an outcome would amount to an abdication of the
Commission's responsibilities to enact regulations that
balance investor protection and capital formation.
I. THE THEORY OF AND NICHE FOR REGULATION A
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 19331 (the 1933 Act) requires
companies selling their own securities to file a registration statement with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC or the Commission) and
disclose prescribed investment information to investors. Both the 1933 Act
itself and the SEC regulations enacted thereunder,3 however, offer issuers
exemptions from the registration and prospectus delivery requirements.
The broad underlying philosophy for the generally available
exemptions from the registration requirement is well captured by section
2(b) of the 1933 Act.4 That provision applies to the Commission when it
enacts exemptions from the registration requirement, and in that case it
instructs the Commission to "consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and
capital formation."5
In our market economy such a balanced approach to society's rules
respecting capital formation is essential. An efficient allocation of capital
requires that investors be protected from fraud, misinformation and
undisclosed material facts. At the same time, rules respecting capital
formation must not be so burdensome that they unreasonably throttle the
migration of capital to its highest and best use.
Regulation A6 was a rational implementation by the Commission of this
philosophy of balance. It provides small businesses an exemption from
1 Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006), amended by Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 105(c), 126 Stat. 311 (2012) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2 The so-called private placement exemption provides an exemption from the
registration requirements of section 5 for "transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering." Id. § 77d(a)(2).
3 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2012) (providing exemptions from registrations
for certain offerings that may roughly be described as small and/or private
offerings).
4 15 U.S.C. § 77b.
' Id. § 77b(b).
6 Acting pursuant to its delegated authority under section 3(b) of the Securities Act
of 1933, the SEC enacted Regulation A, 17 C.F.R §§ 230.251-.263.
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registration for offerings of up to five million dollars.7 The exemption is
predicated on the issuer's filing and disclosure of closely tailored
investment information.
8
Thus, disclosure-the primary investor protection device of the 1933
Act-is a predicate to the exemption's availability, but disclosures are
significantly and rationally limited.9 Mandated disclosure is designed to
protect investors, while the limited amount and nature of the disclosure
requirements is intended to prevent excessive regulatory costs from
foreclosing small businesses from using the Regulation A exemption.
Not only is the Commission's Regulation A philosophically sound as a
rational attempt to balance investor protection and capital formation, but
also it provides-at least apparently-an attractive path for small
businesses to use in accessing external capital. Indeed, Regulation A was
for decades the only generally available exemption from registration that
enabled issuers to make an interstate public offering of their securities.
Stated otherwise, Regulation A was the only generally available exemption
from registration that enabled small companies to engage in a broad,
interstate search for investors.'0
Regulation A, however, fell into nearly complete disuse. The millions
of small businesses in this country, all of which at some point need external
capital to survive and grow, simply did not use Regulation A.
In 2012, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act"
(the JOBS Act). Title IV of the JOBS Act, which is entitled Small Business
Capital Formation, directs the Commission to enact a new exemption
regime that significantly expands the exemption presently provided by
Regulation A.'
2
7 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) ("$5,000,000... less the aggregate offering price for all
securities sold within the twelve months before the start of and during the offering
of securities in reliance upon Regulation A.").
8 The issuer is required to file an offering statement with the Commission, and
provide investors with an offering circular. Id. § 230.25 1(d)(2)(i); see Rutheford B
Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses' Search for "A Moderate Capital,"
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 104-06 (2006) (detailing descriptions of the information
disclosure requirements of a Regulation A offering).
9 Campbell, supra note 8, at 104-06.
10 Regulation A also has a so-called "test the waters" provision, which permits
issuers utilizing Regulation A to solicit broadly indications of interests from
investors before filing an offering statement and providing investors with an
offering circular. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254.
" Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
12 Id. §§ 401-02.
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The purposes of this paper are the following: (a) to describe the reasons
why the Commission's Regulation A utterly failed as a vehicle for small
businesses to access external capital; and (b) to analyze the extent to which
Title IV of the JOBS Act will remedy, or at least ameliorate, the
Commission's Regulation A failure and thus offer small businesses a new
regulatory exemption that allows an efficient access to external capital and
provides society with a regulatory regime that properly balances investor
protection and capital formation.
In Section II of this Article, I provide data demonstrating the non-use of
Regulation A and offer an explanation for this unfortunate circumstance. In
Section III of this Article, I explain Title IV of the JOBS Act and its impact
on small businesses' search for external capital. The conclusions of my
analysis are that it is unlikely that the JOBS Act will either reinvigorate
Regulation A or enhance small businesses' access to external capital.
II. NON-USE OF REGULATION A: DATA AND EXPLANATION
Data available from the Small Business Administration (the SBA) show
that there are more than five million small businesses in the United States
with fewer than twenty employees. 13 These small businesses are vital to our
national economy, accounting for approximately 18% of our national
employment. 14 SBA data show that firms with less than 100 workers
provide as much 36% of our national employment.15
Data show, however, that these millions of small businesses do not rely
on Regulation A as a vehicle for access to external capital. Table I, below,
provides data on the total and average annual numbers of Regulation A
offerings during two recent periods of time. When compared to the millions
of small businesses, Table I demonstrates that Regulation A was essentially
unused by small businesses over the sixteen year period covered by Table I.
13 See SMALL Bus. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 2010, at 121 (2010) [hereinafter THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY 2010]
(in 2007, firms with less than twenty employees employed 5,410,367 workers).
14 See id. at 121 (in 2007, 18.1% of all employment was provided by firms with
less than twenty employees). Earlier SBA data showed a slightly higher percentage
of employment provided by these smallest firms. E.g., SMALL Bus. ADMIN., THE
STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 1999-2000, at 61 (in
1998, 18.8% of all employment was provided by firms with less than twenty
employees).
'5 SMALL Bus. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 2004, at 178 [hereinafter THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY 2004].
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Table I
Time Period Total Number of Average Annual Number
Regulation A Offerings of Regulation A Offerings
1/1/95-12/31/0416 78 7.8
1/1/05-1/1/1117 162 23.1
The non-use of Regulation A cannot be explained by any lack of
demand for external capital by small businesses. Various data sets, for
example, show that 80% to 90% of small businesses rely on external debt as
a way of financing their operations. '
8
Table II, below, also reflects the demand of small businesses for
external capital. The Table is based on 27,234 Form Ds filed in connection
with Regulation D offerings over a recent twenty-five month period. It
shows the total number of all Regulation D offerings during the period that
were one million dollars or less and that were between one million and five
million dollars. Table II also shows the percentages of the total Regulation
D offerings that were within those smaller ranges.
Table I119
Regulation D Offerings Regulation D Offerings of
of $1 Million or Less $1 Million to $5 Million
Number 7880/27,234 7059/27,234
Percentage 28.9% 25.9%
Table II indicates that over the twenty-five month period, a total of
nearly 15,000 Regulation D offerings were made in amounts of less than
16 Campbell, supra note 8, at 83 (data taken from Historical SEC Edgar Archives,
available at http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar?text = -a&first- 1994&last=-
2004&mode=Simple (last visited Oct. 30, 2012)).
17 Regulation A data were obtained from the subscription-only Knowledge Mosaic
website. See Form A Data, KNOWLEDGE MOSAIC, www.knowledgemosaic.com
(last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (follow "SEC Filings" hyperlink; then search "Form 1-
A").
18 See Campbell, supra note 8, at 86-88.
19 Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and
Bad) Outcomes for the SEC's Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 Bus. LAW. 919, 927
(2011). Regulation D data were obtained from the subscription only Knowledge
Mosaic website. The data are for Form D filings from September 15, 2008 to
October 18, 2010. See Form D Data, KNOWLEDGE MOSAIC, www.knowledge
mosaic.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) (follow "Form D" hyperlink; then search
"Form D").
322 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7.2
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
five million dollars.2 ° This represents approximately 55% of all Regulation
D offerings during the period.
The question remains: Why did the millions of small issuers in the
United States, the vast majority of which needed external capital in order to
survive and compete, essentially never use Regulation A, the only generally
available exemption that permitted a wide, interstate search for capital?
In a prior article, I offered two explanations for this curious
circumstance." First, and by far the less important, is the fact that
Regulation A probably needs some fine tuning by the Commission in order
22better to promote efficient small business capital formation. I opined in
my prior article that the five million dollar limit on Regulation A was
"more than adequate to meet the needs or capital raising abilities of most
small issuers. 23 I focused attention on small offerings, where relative
transaction costs are most pernicious to access to external capital. 24 My
article was supportive of the general way in which the Commission has
limited the mandatory disclosures in a Regulation A offering-especially
the financial disclosures-but offered suggestions regarding further
adjustments in Regulation A disclosures in small Regulation A offerings.2 5
My article also suggested limiting bureaucratic oversight as a way of
efficiently reducing offering costs of a Regulation A offering.
26
In short, although my article offered suggestions for improving
Regulation A, the suggestions were rather modest. Certainly my criticisms
did not detract from my strong support for the fundamental theory of
Regulation A, which is to allow a broad and low cost search for investors
while imposing the investor protection provision-mandated, reasonable
level of disclosure of investment information-prior to sale. It is a theory
that is sound and consistent with the overall disclosure philosophy of the
1933 Act.
The other explanation offered in my article for the non-use of
Regulation A is the impact of registration requirements imposed by state
blue sky laws.27 This problem is by far the more significant. The increase in
the relative offering costs generated by the obligations to comply with state
20 Campbell, supra note 19, at 927 (exact total is 14,939 Regulation D offerings of
less than five million dollars).
21 See Campbell, supra note 8, at 112-23.
22 Id. at 112-19.
23Id. at 102.
24Id. at 113.
251Id. at 113-18.
26 Id. at 118 ("any Commission review of Regulation A offerings should be
eliminated").
27 Campbell, supra note 8, at 106-12, 119-21.
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registration provisions simply price Regulation A out of the marketplace for
exemptions, and Table I, above, shows the results.
Small issuers need small amounts of external capital. The obligations to
comply with multiple state registrations requirements drive the relative
offering costs to intolerable levels. As a result, small businesses seeking
external capital must either find other, less desirable avenues for external
capital or, in the worst case, continue to operate without the benefit of
external capital.28 The unique niche for Regulation A is that it offers an
exemption from federal registration requirements for small interstate public
offerings. "Interstate," of course, is the problem. If a small issuer offers its
securities in three states, it must comply with four sets of separate and
independent rules respecting registration (three states' laws and federal
law). If the small issuer offers its securities in all fifty states (think, for
example, of posting an offer on the issuer's website or placing an ad in a
"local" newspaper that may have a modest national distribution), the issuer
must comply with fifty-one sets of entirely independent rules respecting
registration.
Over the years, states have offered various paths to coordinate
Regulation A offerings with state registration requirements, including
exemptions from state regulation requirements 29 and various state
registration alternatives. 30 None of these options, however, has been
28 "Relative" costs are the issuer's expenses necessary to meet the conditions for
the exemptions compared to the total proceeds from the offering. It is relative, not
absolute, costs that practically destroy the availability of an exemption from
registration. For example, if costs of meeting the conditions for an exemption are
$50,000, an issuer would not be willing to use the exemption for a $100,000
offering (relative costs equal 50%) but clearly could use the exemption for a five
million dollar offering (relative costs equal 1%).
29 Typically, the most apparent broadly available state exemption for a Regulation
A offering is the state small offering exemption. See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b),
7C U.L.A. 220 (2002). The severe limitations of the small offering exemption
regarding the permissible number of offerees or purchasers make that exemption
unsuitable for coordination with a Regulation A offering. Id.
30 Most apparent is the traditional state registration by qualification. See, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-12a304 (West Supp. 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.370
(West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10404 (West 2002) (repealed 2005). A
large majority of states have adopted the SCOR (Small Corporate Offering
Registration) form for registering offerings up to one million dollars, including
Regulation A offerings. Small Corporate Offerings Registration Form (Form U- 7),
NASAA Rep. (CCH) 5057, 5197 (Dec. 1999). Some States also permit
registration through coordination with a Regulation A offering. E.g., KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 292.360. Essentially, this method allows issuers relying on
Regulation A to meet their state obligations by filing their Form 1-A with the state.
Id.
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successful as a way for small businesses to meet state requirements in a
Regulation A offering.
31
Regulation A is one of the ironies of modem securities regulation. It is
a sensible and a philosophically sound exemption that should provide
millions of small businesses an efficient access to capital. But it has been
essentially unused by small businesses. In the next section of this paper, I
examine the way Title IV of the JOBS Act impacts Regulation A offerings
and the extent to which it may-or may not-provide small businesses an
efficient access to external capital.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE JOBS ACT ON REGULATION A
AND SMALL BUSINESSES' ACCESS TO CAPITAL
A. Generally
Title IV of the JOBS Act, which is entitled Small Company Capital
Formation, amends section 3(b) of the 1933 Act by adding a new section
3(b)(2).32 That new statute requires the Commission to enact a new section
3(b) regulation providing an exemption from registration for offerings of up
to fifty million dollars.
In order for the regulations enacted by the Commission under new
section 3(b)(2) of the 1933 Act (section 3(b)(2) Regulations) to provide a
rational and efficient access to capital for small businesses, two factors are
critical. First, the costs of meeting the conditions for the exemption under
the section 3(b)(2) Regulations must be reasonable in amount. If
compliance with the new regulations generates unreasonable relative
offering costs, small businesses simply will not be able to use the
exemption.
Second, state authority over the registration of offerings under the
section 3(b)(2) Regulations must be preempted. This, of course, is related to
the first factor, since compliance with state registration requirements
increases relative offering costs. Without complete preemption over
offerings under the section 3(b)(2) Regulations, the regulatory costs of
complying with state registration provisions will drive relative offering
costs for small businesses to intolerable levels.
As a general matter, new section 3(b)(2) delegates to the Commission
authority to deal with both of these matters. History suggests, however, that
31 See Campbell, supra note 8, at 106-10 (explaining the reasons that made
coordination with any of the registration options unsuitable for Regulation A
offerings).
32 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2006), amended by Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 401-02, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c).
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the Commission is unlikely exercise its delegated authority in a way that
provides small businesses an efficient access to external capital under the
section 3(b)(2) Regulations.
B. Terms of New Section 3(b)(2)
Although section 3(b)(2) requires the Commission to enact a new
regulatory exemption from registration, Congress generally delegated broad
discretion to the Commission to prescribe the conditions for the exemption.
It seems clear, however, that the purpose of the legislation is to cause the
Commission to provide a new, larger regulatory exemption modeled on the
regulatory exemption presently available under Regulation A.
The most important of the mandatory provisions in section 3(b)(2)--the
provisions that Congress requires the Commission to impose as a condition
for the exemption-are the aggregate offering limit of fifty million dollars
in any twelve-month period33 and a requirement that the issuer "file audited
financial statements with the commission annually.,
34
The discretionary provisions that may be imposed by the Commission
in section 3(b)(2) offerings are limited essentially only by "the public
interest and ... the protection of investors., 35 Section 2(b) of the 1933 Act3 6
is important with regard to this "public interest" limitation. That section of
the 1933 Act requires that the Commission, when enacting regulations in
the "public interest," must also "consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition and
capital formation. 37
Within this extremely broad delegation of authority, section 3(b)(2)
suggests two requirements that the Commission may impose as a condition
for the availability of the exemption. First, the Commission may predicate
the availability of the exemption on an obligation on the part of the issuer to
file with the Commission and disclose to investors investment
" 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(b)(2)(A) (West 2012) ("aggregate offering amount.., shall
not exceed $50,000,000").34 id.
35 Other than the mandatory provisions described in notes 34 and 35, supra,
additional important provisions of the statute state that the "securities may be
offered ... publicly," id § 77c(b)(2)(B), that the "securities shall not be restricted
securities," id. § 77c(b)(2)(C), that the express civil liabilities under section
12(a)(2), id. § 771(2), shall apply, id. § 77c(b)(2)(C), that the Commission may
allow solicitations of indications of interest prior to any filing with the
Commission, id. § 77c(b)(2)(E), and, that the Commission may impose other
conditions that it "may determine necessary in the public interest," id
§ 77c(b)(2)(G).36 Id. § 77b(b).
37 id.
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information.3 s Second, the Commission may also impose periodic
disclosure requirements on the issuer.39
This brief description shows that in section 3(b)(2) Congress obligates
the Commission to enact an exemption regime that balances investor
protection with capital formation. The language of section 3(b)(2) also
suggests that an integral part of the new section 3(b)(2) Regulations should
be a requirement for disclosures of prescribed investment information to
investors.
The most apparent way for the Commission to implement its
obligations under section 3(b)(2) is by constructing a regime of stepped
disclosures that conditions the section 3(b)(2) exemption on modest
disclosures for small offerings but requires an increase in the amount of
disclosure as the size of the section 3(b)(2) transaction gets larger.
This is not, of course, new for the Commission. Regulation D40 is
perhaps the most apparent example of this approach. As Regulation D
transactions get larger in size, the exemptions of Regulation D generally
require additional investor protection devices, specifically mandated
disclosure and/or purchaser qualifications (accredited investor status or
sophistication).41 Regulation A is also an example of this stepped
approached. In that exemption, the Commission scaled back disclosure
requirements for the smaller Regulation A offerings compared to the
disclosures required in registered offerings on Form S_ 1.42
38 Id. § 77c(b)(2)(G) ("conditions... which may include... (i) a requirement that
the issuer ... file with the Commission and distribute to prospective investors an
offering statement .... ").
" 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(b)(4) (West 2012) (may require issuer "to make available to
investors and file with the Commission periodic disclosures. . . ."). As described
above, see supra note 36 and accompanying textual discussion, a mandatory
provision in section 3(b)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 also requires the issuer to
"file audited financial statements with the commission annually." 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 77c(b)(2)(F).
40 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2012).
41 Rule 504 of Regulation D provides and exemption from registration for offerings
of up to one million dollars. Id. § 230.504. The exemption is not predicated on
disclosure or investor qualification (i.e. accredited investor status or sophistication).
Rule 505 of Regulation D provides an exemption from registration for offerings of
up to five million dollars. Id. § 230.505. The exemption is generally predicated on
the disclosure of prescribed investment information to investors but does not
require investor qualification (i.e. accredited investor status or sophistication). Rule
506 of Regulation D provides and exemption from registration for offerings of
unlimited size. Id. § 230.506. The exemption is generally predicated both on
disclosure of prescribed investment information and investor qualification (i.e.
accredited investor status or sophistication). Id.
42 See Campbell, supra note 8, at 104-06.
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Thus, it might make sense for the Commission to require, for example,
very modest informational disclosure requirements43 for section 3(b)(2)
offerings of one million dollars or less. For offerings of between one
million and five million dollars, the Commission might model
informational disclosure requirements roughly on the present iteration of
Regulation A. Above five million dollars, relative offering costs come into
balance, and the Commission could impose more burdensome disclosure
obligations."
As stated above, the Commission is well prepared to construct a
stepped disclosure regime for section 3(b)(2) offerings that appropriately
balances investor protection and capital formation. Implementing such a
strategy also involves the Commission in no apparent political matters or
administrative turf wars.
The more difficult problem for the Commission-one that,
unfortunately, does involve political matters and turf wars-will be dealing
with the preemption of state authority over section 3(b)(2) offerings. It is
here where I fear the Commission by tepid action or, indeed, by inaction,
will destroy any chance that section 3(b)(2) has to become an effective and
efficient vehicle for small business capital formation.
Title V of the JOBS Act deals with preemption in the context of
section 3(b)(2) offerings by amending the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act 45 (NSMIA) to preempt state registration authority over
section 3(b)(2) offerings if the securities are "offered or sold on a national
securities exchange" or if the securities are "offered or sold to a qualified
purchaser, as defined by the Commission .... Since small businesses of
the kind described in Section II of this article47 are not "offered or sold on a
43 Although section 3(b)(2) empowers the Commission to predicate the section
3(b)(2) exemption of a filing and review requirement, it is difficult to sustain any
argument in favor of such a requirement. The added costs of review and
comment-both in terms of out of pocket and opportunity costs for the issuer and,
also, in terms of the costs of delay-are difficult to justify by increases in economic
efficiency from such a review. Generally, it would seem to make more'sense to rely
on incentives generated by potential antifraud liabilities.
44 Obviously, I am suggesting the same "steps" as the Commission used in
Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508; see discussion supra note 43.
45 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The Act preempted some
state authority over the registration of securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)-(b) (2006),
amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401, 126
Stat. 306 (2012).
46 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r(b)(4)(D).
47 See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying textual discussion.
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national securities exchange, 'A preemption of state authority over section
3(b)(2) offerings by small businesses depends on the investors in such
offerings being "qualified purchasers," as that term is defined by the
Commission.
The history of NSMIA is important with regard to the Commission's
possible definitions of "qualified purchaser." As originally enacted, NSMIA
preempted state authority over offers limited to "qualified purchasers."
Congress, however, refused to define "qualified purchaser" and, instead,
delegated to the Commission authority to define that critical term.49
This delegation of authority to define the term "qualified purchasers"
was broad.5° The only limitation in the statute was a requirement that the
definition of "qualified purchaser" must be "consistent with the public
interest and the protection of investors." 5' As if to emphasize the breadth of
the Commission's power, the statute stated that "the Commission may
define the term 'qualified purchaser' differently with respect to different
categories of securities .... , 52
Since the enactment of NSMIA in 1996, however, the Commission has
shown little interest in expanding preemption by defining the term
"qualified purchaser." In 2001 the Commission did propose to define
48 My assumption is that "offered and sold on a national exchange" means that the
securities are listed for trading on the national exchange.
41 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r(a)(1)(A) (preempting state authority over "covered
securit[ies]"); id. § 77r(b)(3) ("A security is a covered security with respect to the
offer and sale of the security to qualified purchasers, as defined by the Commission
.... .).
50 Writing the year after the enactment of NSMIA, I analyzed the breadth of the
Commission's delegated authority to define "qualified purchaser." Rutheford B
Campbell, Jr. Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, 22
J. CORP. L. 175, 207-10 (1997). My conclusion, after exploring the political and
legislative history of NSMIA and analyzing closely the language of the statue, was
stated as follows:
The plain words of the Act give the Commission ample authority
to enhance significantly the preemption under the Act. Congress
has laid in the Commission's lap, finally, the means to eliminate
state hegemony over capital formation and much of the nonsense
of state blue sky laws and to provide badly needed and long
overdue relief to small entrepreneurs.
Id. at 210.
51 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r(b)(3). Section 2(b) of the 1933 Act also requires that when the
Commission is making rules "in the public interest," the Commission must
"consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation." Id § 77b(b).
52 Id. § 77r(b)(3).
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"qualified purchaser" as "any accredited investor" under Regulation D,53
but the Commission failed to adopt that proposed amendment to NSMIA.
Otherwise, the Commission has done essentially nothing regarding any
significant definition of "qualified purchaser."
Faced now, as it is, with the obligation to enact regulations to
implement new section 3(b)(2), various options are possible regarding a
Commission definition of "qualified purchaser" and the extent of
preemption of state authority over section 3(b)(2) offerings.
One option for the Commission is to follow its historic practice 54 and
refuse to enact any definition of "qualified purchaser." While the JOBS Act
requires the Commission to enact a regulatory regime under section 3(b)(2),
the JOBS Act contains no explicit mandate for the Commission to define
"qualified purchaser" as a part of its regulatory implementation of the Act.
A Commission failure to define the term, however, would seem an
abdication of its responsibilities, since it would destroy the availability of
section 3(b)(2) for small issuers. As noted above, small businesses are not
traded on national exchanges, and thus preemption over section 3(b)(2)
offerings by small businesses can come only if a small business utilizing
section 3(b)(2) limits its investors to "qualified purchasers." With no
definition of that term, small businesses would be unable to attain
preemption and, accordingly, be effectively foreclosed from use of new
section 3(b)(2).
A second option for the Commission is to define a "qualified
purchaser" as an "accredited investor" within the meaning of Regulation
D.55 This second option also essentially kills section 3(b)(2) for small
business capital formation. Defining "qualified purchaser" as an "accredited
investor" severely limits the investor pool. Less than 5% of the population
may meet that definition of "accredited investor., 56 Obviously, excluding
such a huge majority of the population from potential investors in a section
3(b)(2) offering by small businesses takes away any advantages that small
businesses may gain by relying on the exemption. Small businesses
operating under such a regime cannot solicit broadly for investors.
What certainly will be the consequences of such a definition (whether
intended or unintended) will be to move small business capital formation
53 Defining the Term "Qualified Purchasers" Under the Securities Act of 1933,
Securities Act Release No. 8041, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,839 (Dec. 27, 2001).
54 Id.; see infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
55 This option was proposed by the Commission in 2001, but it was never adopted.
See Defining the Term "Qualified Purchasers" Under the Securities Act of 1933,
supra note 53.
56 Internal Revenue Service data from 2007 show that only 3.172% of all tax
returns reported income of $200,000 or more. Justin Bryan, High-Income Tax
Returns for 2007, STAT. INCOME BULL. (Internal Revenue Serv.), Spring 2010, at 4.
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away from any section 3(b)(2) exemption and into Rule 506 offerings. Once
the Commission acts to implement Title II of the JOBS Act,57 small issuers
using Rule 506 and limiting their purchasers to accredited investors will be
able to solicit broadly for investors (i.e. use general advertising to find
investors) and sell to an unlimited number of accredited investors. 8 These
Rule 506 offerings limited to accredited investors, however, generate no
disclosure obligations as a condition for the availability of the Rule 506
exemption.59 It seems certain, however, that the conditions for the
availability of the section 3(b)(2) exemption imposed by the Commission
will require some measure of disclosure. It is difficult to see why, in such
circumstances, small businesses in search of external capital would use
section 3(b)(2) instead of Rule 506.60
A third option for the Commission is to define "qualified purchaser" as
anyone who purchases under the section 3(b)(2). This, certainly, is the most
appropriate of the three options.6' Unfortunately, it is also the option least
likely to be adopted by the Commission.
If the Commission were to define "qualified purchaser" in this fashion
and combine this with a closely tailored, stepped approach to disclosure and
periodic reporting requirements, section 3(b)(2) could become an important
exemption for small businesses capital formation. It would enable small
57 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d). Title II is entitled "Access to Capital for
Job Creators."
58 On August 29, 2012, the Commission promulgated its proposed regulatory
implementation of Congress's mandate regarding Rule 506, The Commission's
proposal permits general solicitations and general advertisings in Rule 506
offerings. Such broadly advertised Rule 506 offerings can be sold only to
"accredited investors." Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation
and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act
Release No. 9354, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,464 (Sept. 5, 2012).
59 There are no disclosure requirements for an offering under Rule 506 that is
limited to accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506 (2012), 230.502(b)(1).
60 One advantage of using section 3(b)(2) is that investors could resell their section
3(b)(2) securities immediately. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(b)(2)(c) (West 2012) ("securities
shall not be restricted securities"). Rule 506 securities are restricted. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.502(d) (2012) (securities acquired under Rule 506 have the same status as
"securities acquired ... under section 4(2)"). This means that investors would be
required to hold the securities for six or twelve months before resale under Rule
144 or privately. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. Such a short holding period with the option
to sell privately may not amount to a material impediment to capital formation in
the case of most small companies.
61 A better definition would be for the Commission to define a "qualified
purchaser" as anyone purchasing under a section 3(b) exemption. For a discussion
of this, see Campbell, supra note 50, at 207-10 (describing the policy justifications
and the statutory and legislative history justifications for the Commission's
exercise of broad preemption under NSMIA).
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businesses to solicit broadly for external capital without any investor
qualification requirements (e.g., sophistication or accredited investor
requirements), limitations on the number of offerees or purchasers62 or
restrictions on the resale of securities. Perhaps most important, such a
regime would permit a broad solicitation for investors without the necessity
of complying with the daunting-and expensive-task of meeting the
registration requirements of multiple state registration regimes.
Investors, for their part, would be protected by mandated disclosure of
prescribed investment information, which is consistent with the disclosure
philosophy that is the very core of the 1933 Act. The Commission with its
vast experience, expertise and resources could construct these disclosure
requirements under the obligation to balance investor protection and capital
formation.
This option, however, is unlikely because it would amount to an
expansion of preemption of state authority over registration, and the
Commission has a history of unwillingness to push the preemption issue
and thus encounter the predictable enmity of state regulators. In the
enactment of NSMIA and the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 201063 (Dodd-Frank), for example, the
Commission refused to advocate in favor of preemption, even though it was
apparent that state regulation was destroying the availability of efficient
federal exemptions from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.
State regulators, however, have robustly fought preemption through
advocacy and the use of other legislative strategies.64
62 It seems highly likely that the Commission in its section 3(b)(2) Regulations will
permit small issuers to continue to "test the waters," similar to the present
regulations governing Regulation A offerings. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(b)(2)(E) (the
Commission may allow solicitations of indications of interest prior to any filing
with the Commission).
63 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18,
22 and 42 U.S.C.).
64 See Campbell, supra note 19, at 936-40. With regard to the enactment of
NSMIA, "the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA)...
offered strong opposition to the legislation." Id. at 937. On the other hand, Arthur
Levitt, who was then Chairman of the Commission, in his testimony and prepared
remarks during the legislative hearings "skillfully dodged any support for broad
preemption of state authority over securities offerings." Id. When Senator
Christopher Dodd circulated a discussion draft of the bill that "would later become
the core of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act," the
discussion draft contained a provision that "would have eliminated preemption of
state authority over Rule 506 offerings." Id. at 938 (citations omitted). It was
apparent that state regulators, acting through NASAA, were the architects of this
strategy. See, e.g., Letter from Scott Edward Walker to Senator Christopher J.
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While one may understand the reluctance of the Commission to get
itself crosswise with its fellow regulators, the Commission's inaction has
essentially permitted states to wreck Regulation A, which should have been
a very attractive path for small business capital formation. This, I suggest,
is unfortunate for small business and the economy and amounts to an
abdication of the Commission's express responsibilities under section 2(b)
of the 1933 Act65 to balance investor protection and capital formation.
My fear, therefore, is that the Commission will adopt some version of
option one or two, above, essentially foreclosing small businesses from
using the new section 3(b)(2) exemption provided by Title IV of the JOBS
Act, which-ironically-is entitled "Small Company Capital Formation."
IV. CONCLUSION
Title IV of the JOBS Act delegates to the Commission the authority to
enact new regulations that provide small businesses with an efficient access
to capital and cure the problems that have made Regulation A unusable.
For this to happen, however, the Commission's regulations under the
JOBS Act must be based on a stepped disclosure regime that requires
companies to provide investors with increasing levels of investment
information as the size of offerings increase. Even more important, the
Commission also must exercise its delegated authority to preempt state
registration authority over section 3(b)(2) offerings by small businesses.
Dodd (Mar. 31, 2010); Bill Carleton & Joe Wallin, Dodd's Attack on Angel
Financing, PUGET SOUND Bus. J. (Mar. 15, 2010, 1:15 PM), http://techflash.com/
seattle/2010/03/congressattack on angelfinancing.html; Broc Romanek, Dodd
Bill Peculiarities: The SEC s Reg D Preemption Gets Hammered,
THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET (Mar. 23, 2010, 9:09 AM), http://www.thecorporate
counsel.net/Blog/2010/03/an-office-of-investor-advocate.html. Again, as in the
legislative hearings leading to the adoption of NSMIA, the Commission offered no
meaningful support for the preservation of preemption for Rule 506 offerings. See
Campbell, supra note 19, at 939. In 2001, the Commission offered a proposal to
define "qualified purchaser" as an "accredited investor." Defining the Term
"Qualified Purchasers" Under the Securities Act of 1933, supra note 53. The
Commission failed to adopt the amendment. One explanation for the Commission's
failure was objections from state regulators, who resisted any loss of state authority
over registration. NASAA and States Oppose Proposed Definition of Qualified
Purchaser, 202-63 SEC TODAY 1-2 (Apr. 2, 2002) ("NASAA... expressed
concerns that the preemption will increase the risk of fraud. States frequently use
violations of their registration provisions as the basis for stopping fraud, NASAA
explained.").
65 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(b).
2012 Regulation A and the JOBS Act: 333
A Failure to Resuscitate
The question is whether the Commission has the will to implement such
an efficient regulatory regime under this new delegated authority.
Unfortunately for small businesses-and the economy-history suggests
that it does not.
